Restaurant Chapter 11 Filings Rose an Estimated 50% in 2024
Only 58% of operators were profitable in 2025 and Chapter 11 filings rose an estimated 50% in 2024. The problem is often capital structure, not the concept.

Restaurant Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings rose an estimated 50% in 2024, and the industry is still watching familiar brands, franchisees and restaurant groups file for restructuring or close units. The context makes that figure more striking, not less. The National Restaurant Association projects total restaurant sales of $1.55 trillion in 2026, up from 2025, yet real inflation-adjusted growth this year runs at just 1.3%. Six in ten operators reported declining traffic in 2025. Only 58% said they were profitable.
On paper, that is a healthy industry. Peek under the hood and more restaurants face financial distress than before. The distinction matters because fixing the wrong problem can make a difficult situation worse.
Who actually owns the distress?
The ownership structure behind a restaurant can be complex. The franchisor may own the brand and collect royalties. A franchisee operates the restaurants and carries unit-level debt. A third party may own the real estate. A financial sponsor may hold multiple brands under a leveraged parent company. Each layer carries different economics, obligations and vulnerabilities.
Private equity invested an estimated $94.5 billion in bars and restaurants between 2014 and 2024, according to PitchBook data, and the pace has not slowed: Subway, Tropical Smoothie Cafe and Jersey Mike's all changed hands to PE owners in deals announced between 2023 and 2024. According to CNBC and PitchBook data, nearly half of restaurant and bar chains that filed for bankruptcy in 2024 were PE-backed. Capital structure has become central to understanding restaurant distress.
What did the sale-leasebacks do?
Sale-leasebacks illustrate the mechanism. Selling restaurant real estate unlocks capital for growth or other investments. It also converts an owned asset into a recurring fixed obligation. When sales grow, the rent may be manageable. When traffic softens, the obligation does not soften with it.
Red Lobster offers the extreme case. Following its 2014 acquisition, a $1.5 billion sale-leaseback converted the chain's real estate into leases with annual rent escalators. By 2023, rent reached roughly $190 million a year — about 10% of revenue and about six times the company's annual interest expense — before food, labor or utilities entered the equation. Rents were widely considered above market, and $64 million of that rent sat on unprofitable locations. On a funded-debt basis, Red Lobster entered bankruptcy with less than $300 million of secured debt. On a lease-adjusted basis, it carried something closer to $1.8 billion.
The same principle applies to franchised systems. A national brand can keep performing while an individual franchisee struggles under acquisition debt, development obligations, rising wages, food costs and softer traffic. Distress is increasingly emerging at the franchisee level even when the overarching brand remains viable.
How much leverage is too much?
Leaders, lenders and investors need to separate four-wall economics from the broader capital structure. The questions are specific. Is the restaurant generating adequate restaurant-level EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization)? Is corporate overhead too high? Is the franchisee overleveraged? Are lease obligations consuming too much cash? Are debt or SG&A (selling, general and administrative) costs at the parent level creating pressure that individual restaurants cannot solve? Those are different problems requiring different remedies.
The operating environment makes the diagnosis urgent. Food prices rose 3% over the year ended June 2026, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, with food-away-from-home prices up 3.4%, while hospitality wages keep rising to track inflation. Full-service restaurant margins frequently remain in the low single digits. Total lease-adjusted leverage for a healthy operator or franchisor commonly runs roughly 4.75 to 5.75 times debt to EBITDA, while distressed franchisees and PE-backed platforms can reach six-to-eight times or higher before a covenant breaks. There is little margin for error.
What should operators do first?
The first response to financial pressure should be diagnosis, not panic:
- Separate restaurant-level performance from corporate overhead and lease burden.
- Map the debt across the organization.
- Understand the real estate obligations.
- Maintain a rolling 13-week cash flow forecast.
- Determine which units generate cash and which consume it.
Do it fast. Waiting until a lender, landlord or noteholder dictates the timeline dramatically reduces management's options.
Not every restaurant under financial pressure is a bad restaurant. Sometimes the answer is operational improvement, sometimes renegotiated leases or debt, sometimes restructuring an overleveraged franchisee while the brand stays healthy, and sometimes exiting underperforming locations to protect the stronger core. What separates the businesses that survive may have less to do with whether customers like the food and more to do with whether management understands exactly where the financial pressure sits. Before trying to fix the restaurant, make sure it is the restaurant that is actually broken.
More from Rebecca Stone
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Senior reporter covering technology and product news in Restaurant and hotel operations at The Pass Brief.
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